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WHEN REASONABLE JURISTS COULD DISAGREE:




With increasing frequency during the past decade, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
dismissed criminal defendants' direct appeals as "frivolous"
under Fifth Circuit Local Rule 42.2.' Likewise, in federal habeas
corpus cases, the Fifth Circuit increasingly has denied prisoners
a certificate of probable cause ("CPC") (recently renamed a
"certificate of appealability" ("COA" )),2 a ruling that is
tantamount to a finding that a habeas appeal is frivolous or
borders on frivolousness.3
In cases where the Fifth Circuit deems a criminal law issue
to be frivolous, the initial effect of such a finding is that the
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Houston, Texas. J.D., Columbia Law School;
B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The views expressed in this article are
the author's own and are not necessarily shared by any other member of the Federal Public
Defender's office in Houston.
1. See e.g. U.S. v. Vasquez-Bernal, No. 98-40553 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999); U.S. v.
Salazar-Olivares, 179 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Morales-Ortiz, No. 98-50179 (5th
Cir. Oct. 21, 1998); U.S. v. Arizmende-Matias, No. 98-50126 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 1998); U.S.
v. Hoffman, 96-20836 (5th Cir. June 17, 1997); U.S. v. Platero-Umanzor, No. 96-10563
(5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1996); U.S. v. Burleson, 22 F.3d 93 (5th Cir. 1994).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1994); see e.g. Lamb v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 352 (5th Cir.
1999); Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1999); Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115
(5th Cir. 1997).
3. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-94 (1983), a federal habeas corpus case,
in which the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he primary means of separating meritorious
from frivolous appeals should be the decision to grant or withhold a certificate of probable
cause" and that "the issuance of a certificate of probable cause generally should indicate
that an appeal is not legally frivolous." But see id. at 892-93 (noting the view "that
'probable cause' requires something more than the absence of frivolity") (citation omitted).
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prisoner's appeal is summarily dismissed without oral argument
and without the more careful judicial consideration received by
an appeal on the Fifth Circuit's oral argument calendar. The
systematic impact of this trend is a chilling effect on appellate
advocacy in criminal cases that results from increased threats of
sanctions by the court,4 and, in at least one recent case, the actual
imposition of monetary sanctions on court-appointed appellate
counsel .!
What is most disturbing about the Fifth Circuit's increasing
willingness to label direct and habeas appeals by prisoners as
frivolous is the court's chronic misapplication of the well-
established standard for determining what is "frivolous."
Simply put, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly deemed an issue
frivolous when conflicting decisions of other courts have
deemed the very same issue not only nonfrivolous but actually
meritorious. As discussed below, under the Supreme Court's
frivolousness standard, an issue is necessarily nonfrivolous
when decisions of other courts directly support a defendant's
claim.
II. THE FRIVOLOUSNESS STANDARD AS DEFINED BY THE
SUPREME COURT
In numerous criminal and civil cases during the last four
decades, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of when an appeal is "frivolous." 6 In a series of decisions
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Court held that a criminal
defendant was permitted to pursue an appeal-and, if found
indigent, to receive the assistance of appointed counsel and to
proceed in forma pauperis-so long as his case presented at least
one issue that was "not frivolous." 7 In these cases, the Court did
not offer any standard governing the determination of whether
4. See e.g. Salazar-Olivares, 179 F.3d at 230 (threatening appellant's counsel that
future appeals deemed frivolous could result in sanctions imposed by the court); Burleson,
22 F.3d at 95 (same).
5. See U.S. v. Gaitan, 171 F.3d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1999).
6. In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), the Court held that the term
"frivolous" has the same meaning in civil and criminal contexts.
7. See e.g. Johnson v. U.S., 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957) (per curiam); Farley v. U.S., 354
U.S. 521, 522-23 (1957) (per curiam); Ellis v. U.S., 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958) (per curiam);
Coppedge v. U.S., 369 U.S. 438,446-47 (1962).
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an issue is "frivolous."
In Anders v. California, the Court set forth the procedures
governing direct criminal appeals when counsel for the
defendant determines that an appeal is frivolous and, thus,
wishes to withdraw. During the course of setting forth the proper
procedure in such a case, the Court stated that a criminal
defendant's appeal is frivolous if its "legal points [are not]
arguable on their merits." 9 The Court did not otherwise define
the term "frivolous."
In Barefoot v. Estelle,'° a federal habeas corpus appeal, the
Court did offer such a definition. It held that a claim for relief is
"legally frivolous" only if it "is squarely foreclosed by statute,
rule, or authoritative court decision, or is lacking any factual
basis in the record of the case."" The Court further stated that an
issue is nonfrivolous if that issue is "debatable among jurists of
reason" or, put another way, if "a court could resolve the issue[]
[in a different manner]." 2 The Barefoot Court's use of the term
"authoritative court decision" obviously did not refer to a
circuit court's negative resolution of a particular issue in a prior
case, but, instead, referred to a prior, adverse decision of the
Supreme Court itself.
In two subsequent cases, a civil rights appeal and a habeas
corpus appeal, the Supreme Court expressly held that an issue
raised by an appellant on appeal to a circuit court is, by
definition, nonfrivolous if it finds direct support in decisions of
other lower courts and the issue has not yet been addressed by
the Supreme Court, even if circuit precedent squarely forecloses
the particular claim. In the habeas case, Lozada v. Deeds,'3 the
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's summary decision to deny a
certificate of probable cause. The Supreme Court found that, at
the time that the Ninth Circuit had denied CPC, the issue raised
by the petitioner found direct support in an earlier, contrary
decision of another circuit, and, therefore, the issue was
8. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
9. Id. at 744.
10. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
11. Id. at 894.
12. Id. at 893 n. 4 (brackets and italics in original; citation omitted).
13. 498 U.S. 430, 432 (1991) (per curiam).
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"'debatable among jurists of reason."' 14 Clearly, in holding that
a CPC should have been granted, the Supreme Court deemed the
issue nonfrivolous in view of the split among the lower courts
on the issue raised by Lozada.'5
In McKnight v. General Motors Corp.,6 the Court
unanimously disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion
that a civil rights litigant's contention in 1992 that section 101 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied retroactively was
"frivolous." The appellee in that case had moved to dismiss the
appeal as frivolous in light of prior Seventh Circuit precedent
that held that the 1991 Act was not retroactive. The Court's
reasoning in reversing the Seventh Circuit was as follows:
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's
argument that [the 1991 Act] applies retroactively. [citing
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994),
which was decided after McKnight's litigation in the courts
below]. However, if the only basis for the order [dismissing
the appeal as frivolous] was that his retroactivity argument
was foreclosed by Circuit precedent, the order was not
proper. As petitioner noted in his memorandum opposing
dismissal and sanctions, this Court had not yet ruled on the
application of [the 1991 Act] to pending cases [and did not
do so until 1994]. Filing an appeal was the only way
petitioner could preserve the issue [for review by the
Supreme Court]. Although, as of September 30, 1992 [i.e.,
the time of the appeal to the Seventh Circuit] there was no
circuit conflict on the retroactivity question, that question
had divided the District Courts and its answer was not so
clear as to make petitioner's position frivolous. 7
Thus, a line of Supreme Court cases culminating in
McKnight firmly stands for the proposition that an appeal is not
frivolous if the appellant raises an issue that finds direct support
in a decision of another court. In such a case, the issue is
nonfrivolous because it could be (indeed, it was) decided
differently by another court.'8 Put another way, if the lower
14. See id. at 432 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4).
15. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 894 ("[T]he issuance of a certificate of probable cause
generally should indicate that an appeal is not legally frivolous.").
16. 511 U.S. 659, 659-60 (1994) (per curiam).
17. Id.
18. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4. The Supreme Court's frivolousness standard is
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courts are divided on a particular issue, it can never be
characterized as an "indisputably meritless legal theory." 19
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S REPEATED MISAPPLICATION OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S FRIVOLOUSNESS STANDARD
In recent years, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly failed to
recognize that a claim raised by a prisoner is automatically
nonfrivolous on direct appeal or automatically worthy of a CPC
or COA on habeas corpus review if the claim finds direct
support in a decision of another court.
For instance, in United States v. Platero-Umanzor,° a
defendant convicted of illegal reentry into the United States after
a deportation" contended that his prior "aggravated felony"
conviction was an element of the offense that must be alleged in
the indictment rather than a mere sentencing enhancement.2 The
court found the defendant's claim to be "frivolous" and
summarily dismissed it under Fifth Circuit Rule 42.2.23 In
characterizing the issue as frivolous, the court cited a prior Fifth
Circuit decision that had rejected an identical claim on the
in accord with the well-established standard in civil cases governing whether a litigant is
subject to sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure II for making a frivolous or patently unreasonable legal argument. In such
cases, the Fifth Circuit has held that a party or party's attorney is not subject to sanctions
unless a claim or defense asserted is not "arguably supported by existing law, or any
reasonably based suggestion for its extension, modification, or reversal." Coghlan v.
Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation and internal question omitted);
Smith Intl., Inc. v. Texas Com. Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1988). Thus, if a
litigant relies on a decision of a court other than the Fifth Circuit in seeking to extend,
modify, or even reverse existing Fifth Circuit precedent, the litigant is not subject to
sanctions under rules II or 38.
19. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (characterizing a "frivolous" claim
as relying on an "indisputably meritless legal theory"). This is not to say that the only way
for a defendant to establish that an issue is nonfrivolous is to rely on a case exactly on point
from some other court. Case law offering analogous support to the defendant's issue could
also be sufficient to make the issue "arguable on [its] merits," Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 744 (1967), "debatable among jurists of reason," or show that another court
"could decide the issue in a different manner." Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4.
20. No. 96-10563 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1996).
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(2) (1994).
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1994) (defendant with a prior aggravated felony conviction
subject to enhanced penalties).
23. See U.S. v. Platero-Umanzor, No. 96-10563, slip op. at 1-2 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1996).
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merits.24 However, in that prior case, Judge Carolyn Dineen King
dissented and contended that a defendant's prior aggravated
felony conviction was an element of the offense. 5 Judge King's
dissent in Vasquez-Olvera noted that decisions by other courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, had held that a defendant's prior
aggravated felony conviction was an element of the offense and
not simply a sentencing enhancement.26
Clearly, at the time the Fifth Circuit decided Platero-
Umanzor, the split among the lower courts and the absence of an
authoritative decision by the Supreme Court rendered the issue
nonfrivolous.27 Indeed, a year later the Supreme Court granted
21certiorari in another Fifth Circuit case raising the same issue.
Unquestionably, the Court would not have granted certiorari if
the issue were frivolous. Although the Court ultimately held that
a defendant's prior aggravated felony conviction was a
sentencing enhancement, 29 four Justices dissented and contended
that it was an element of the offense. 0 Such an issue, which
sharply divided jurists in both the lower court and the Supreme
Court itself, was clearly nonfrivolous.
In United States v. Hoffman,3' the Fifth Circuit dismissed
the defendant's appeal as frivolous based on a waiver of the
defendant's right to appeal contained in a plea agreement."
However, prior to the dismissal, the defendant had explained
that there were two reasons why the waiver was unenforceable
and provided decisions from other courts directly supporting her
specific contentions.33 First, the defendant, who was challenging
the voluntariness of her guilty plea on appeal, noted that other
courts had held that a claim that a guilty plea was involuntary
24. See id. (citing U.S. v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 945-47 (5th Cir. 1993)).
25. See U.S. v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, J.,
dissenting).
26. Id. at 946 (citing U.S. v. Gonzalez-Medina, 976 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1992)).
27. Platero-Umanzor, No. 96-10563 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1996).
28. See AImendarez-Torres v. U.S., 520 U.S. 1154 (1998).
29. See AImendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
30. See 0. at 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.).
31. No. 96-20836 (5th Cir. June 17, 1997).
32. See id. at 1-2.
33. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-4, U.S. v. Hoffman, No. 96-20836 (5th Cir. June
17. 1997).
WHEN REASONABLE JURISTS COULD DISAGREE
cannot be waived in a plea agreement. 4 Second, the defendant
noted that the district court had informed her at sentencing that
she had a right to appeal and the prosecution stood silent in
response to the court's assurance. She cited decisions by other
courts that held that a district court's statement at sentencing that
an appeal was permitted, without any objection from the
prosecution, rendered an appeal waiver void.35 Although these
decisions by other circuits were cited and discussed in
Hoffman's pleadings on appeal, the Fifth Circuit made no
reference to the contrary decisions of other courts and
summarily dismissed the appeal as frivolous based on the waiver
provision in the plea agreement.
3 6
In a myriad of illegal reentry cases in which a defendant
has contended that his prior conviction for drug possession does
not constitute an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(43) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1) (which adopts the
statutory definition from 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), the Fifth
Circuit has rejected the claim as frivolous after citing a prior
Fifth Circuit case37 that rejected the claim on the merits 8
However, the claim, which is based on statutory interpretation,
finds direct support in a unanimous decision of the en banc
34. See e.g. U.S. v. Padilla-Gonzales, 100 F.3d 965 (table), 1996 WL 622937, at *1 n.l
(9th Cir. 1996) ("Contrary to the government's assertions, Padilla-Gonzalez's waiver of
appellate rights does not preclude us from reviewing the issue of whether the guilty plea
was knowing and voluntary."); Bello v. People, 886 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)
(same); cf. U.S. v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1994) (in the process of
determining whether defendant's waiver of right to appeal in plea agreement was
enforceable, the court addressed the threshold issue of whether the guilty plea itself was
voluntary).
35. See U.S. v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1995), in which the court held:
Litigants need to be able to trust the oral pronouncements of district court
judges. Given the district court judge's clear statements at sentencing [that the
defendant had a right to appeal], the defendant's assertion of understanding, and
the prosecution's failure to object [based on the waiver-of-appeal provision in
the plea agreement], we hold that in these circumstances, the district court's oral
pronouncement controls and the plea agreement waiver is not enforceable.
See also Everard v. U.S., 102 F.3d 763, 766 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Buchanan, 59 F.3d at
918).
36. See U.S. v. Hoffman, No. 96-20836, slip op. at 1-2 (5th Cir.June 17, 1997); see also
U.S. v. Hoffman, No. 96-20836, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc (5th Cir. July 24, 1997).
37. See U.S. v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691,693-94 (5th Cir. 1997).
38. See e.g. U.S. v. Morales-Ortiz, No. 98-50179 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 1998); U.S. v.
Arizmende-Matias, No. 98-50126 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 1998).
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Board of Immigration Appeals in In re L-G-. 39 In In re L-G-,
the BIA, which hears appeals from rulings of immigration
judges in civil immigration cases, interpreted 8 U.S.C. §
110 1(a)(43) to exclude a conviction for drug possession as an
"aggravated felony." Although the BIA consists of reasonable
jurists, 4' the Fifth Circuit inexplicably has deemed the
unanimous en banc BIA's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §
1 101(a)(43) to be frivolous.
In United States v. Vasquez-Bernal,42 the defendant
contended that the district court violated the plain language of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1(c)(1) by accepting the
defendant's guilty plea without warning him of the statutory
maximum sentence he faced upon conviction. The Fifth Circuit
acknowledged in an unpublished opinion that the district court
violated Rule 1 1(c)(1) but held that the issue was frivolous
because the error was deemed harmless by the court, even
though the prosecution conceded that the record did not reveal
that the defendant was actually aware of the statutory range of
punishment at the time he entered a guilty plea.4'3 The court
reasoned that the error was harmless because there was no
evidence that the defendant would have pleaded not guilty and
gone to trial if he had been informed of the statutory maximum
punishment before pleading."a
The Fifth Circuit's finding of frivolousness in Vasquez-
Bernal was in direct conflict with prior, decisions of the Ninth
Circuit applying Rule 11, which have held that a district court's
failure to advise a defendant of the maximum punishment that
he faces is not harmless error if the record does not show that
the defendant was actually aware of the statutory range of
punishment at the time that he pleaded guilty.4  More
39. 1995 WL 582051 (BIA 1995) (en banc).
40. Id.
41. Cf Kin Sang Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1993) (affording "considerable
weight and deference" to BIA's interpretation of another immigration statute).
42. No. 98-40553 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999).
43. Id. at 3-5.
44. Id. at 3-5.
45. See U.S. v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1988); accord U.S.
v. Campos, 48 F.3d 1229 (table), 1995 WL 74763, at *1 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, in a
prior Fifth Circuit case, which was later overruled by the en banc Fifth Circuit, the court
had held that a district court's failure to advise a defendant of the statutory range of
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significantly, the Fifth Circuit's finding of frivolousness in
Vasquez-Bernal was also in direct conflict with prior Fifth
Circuit cases holding that a defendant's ignorance of the
statutory maximum punishment renders his guilty plea
involuntary and, thus, unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause.46 It is well established that an involuntary guilty plea is
reversible error even if the record on appeal supports the
conclusion that the defendant "would have pleaded guilty
anyway," i.e., notwithstanding the involuntary nature of his
guilty plea.47
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Vasquez-Bernal that the
defendant's challenge to his guilty plea was frivolous flies in the
face of such well-established binding authority. On rehearing,
the court modified its opinion by deleting its finding of
frivolousness. Instead, the court simply affirmed the judgment of
the trial court and ordered the opinion published.48
The Fifth Circuit has similarly erred in federal habeas
corpus appeals. For instance, in United States v. Magallon,49 a
certificate for appealability was summarily denied in a case in
which the petitioner alleged that he did not adequately waive his
constitutional right to testify by merely silently acquiescing in
his trial counsel's decision to rest his case without calling any
witnesses. Although the petitioner had cited majority decisions
of two state supreme courts and a dissenting opinion of a federal
circuit judge that held that due process requires a defendant's
waiver of his right to testify to be expressly on the record during
a colloquy with the trial court, ° the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
denied a COA.5"
punishment at a guilty plea proceeding was not amenable to harmless-error analysis and,
thus, was subject to automatic reversal on appeal. See U.S. v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 679
(5th Cir. 1990), overruled by U.S. v. Johnson, I F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
46. See e.g. Lewellyn v. Wainwright, 593 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. See e.g. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45 & n.12 (1976).
48. U.S. v. Vasquez-Bernal, 197 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999).
49. No. 98-20830 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999).
50. See People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984); State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d
77, 81-82 (W. Va. 1988); see also U.S. v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 764-65 & n. 11 (9th Cir.
1989) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991).
51. See U.S. v. Magallon, No. 98-20830, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999).
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In Penry v. Johnson," the majority of a Fifth Circuit panel
denied a COA with respect to the death row inmate's argument
that the jury instructions submitted in his case violated the
Eighth Amendment by failing to give an adequate vehicle for
jurors to consider his mitigating evidence of mental retardation
and child abuse. One judge on the panel, Judge Dennis, issued a
dissenting opinion that contended that the jury instructions were
constitutionally invalid.53 How such a divided panel of judges
could deny a COA under the Barefoot standard defies logic.54 In
November of 2000, the Supreme Court stayed Penry's death
sentence55 and granted certiorari in his caseand reversed 1 6 -a
clear indication that the issues presented in his case were not
frivolous. 7
In Turner v. Johnson," the habeas petitioner argued that the
Constitution requires the prosecution's allegations of
unadjudicated 'extraneous offenses offered during the capital
sentencing phase to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Fifth Circuit deemed this claim unworthy of a CPC-describing
it as "not contain[ing] any indicia of merit" '9-notwithstanding
the court's recognition in a prior case that "numerous lower
courts" in other jurisdictions had taken a contrary position on
that particular issue.6°
In White v. Johnson,6 the habeas petitioner contended that
his death sentence was unconstitutional because it would
52. 215 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2000).
53. Id. at 513-14 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
54. The same bizarre result occurred in a prior Fifth Circuit capital habeas case. Over
the vigorous dissent of one judge-who contended that one of the capital defendant's
claims warranted habeas corpus relief-an earlier panel of the Fifth Circuit denied a death
row inmate a CPC in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).
55. 121 S. Ct. 510 (2000).
56. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910 (2001).
57. In numerous other habeas corpus cases, the Fifth Circuit has denied CPC only to
have the Supreme Court grant certiorari on the issue. See e.g. Graham v. Lynaugh, 854
F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 492 U.S. 915 (1989); Selvage v. Lynaugh, 842
F.2d 89, 95 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 493 U.S. 888 (1989); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d
285, 298 (5th Cir.) (denying CPC by a vote of 2-1), cert. granted, 482 U.S. 932 (1987).
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari and address the merits of
an issue necessarily means that it is anything but frivolous.
58. 106 F.3d 1178, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1997).
59. Id. at 1190.
60. See U.S. v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 344-45 & n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993).
61. 79 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1996).
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constitute cruel and unusual punishment to execute him after he
had spent nearly two decades on death row. The Fifth Circuit
denied CPC on this claim even though the Supreme Court in
another case recently had entered a stay of execution so that the
lower courts could consider the same issue.62 According to the
Supreme Court's well-established standard governing stays of
execution, the Court would not have entered a stay of execution
on the issue unless it presented "substantial grounds upon which
relief might be granted" and, furthermore, that there was a
"reasonable probability" that certiorari would be granted and a
"significant possibility" that the issue would prove
meritorious. 63 Nevertheless, despite this recent action by the
Supreme Court on the very same issue in another case, the Fifth
Circuit in White did not even view the issue to be worthy of a
CPC
. 4
In McFarland v. Collins,65 the Fifth Circuit denied a CPC to
an indigent habeas petitioner who had unsuccessfully contended
that he had both the right to appointed counsel on habeas corpus
review and the concomitant right to a temporary stay of
execution in order to permit an appointed lawyer to file a
meaningful habeas petition. The Fifth Circuit denied CPC on
this issue even though the petitioner had cited a prior decision of
the Ninth Circuit that directly supported his argument that he
was entitled to appointed habeas counsel and a stay of
execution.66 The Supreme Court made it clear that the Fifth
Circuit had erred in McFarland. Not only did the Court grant
certiorari on this issue in McFarland's case, the Court ultimately
reversed the Fifth Circuit.
Like the numerous Fifth Circuit direct appeals discussed
above, which deemed criminal defendants' appeals to be
frivolous notwithstanding contrary decisions of other courts that
directly supported the defendants' positions, the foregoing
62. See Lackey v. Scott, 514 U.S. 1093 (1995), reversing denial of stay of execution in
Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1995). Two Supreme Court Justices also had
described the issue as an "important[,] undecided one" that warranted a "careful study" by
the lower courts. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (opinions of Stevens & Breyer,
JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari).
63. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983).
64. White, 79 F.3d at 437-40.
65. 7 F.3d 47, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1993).
66. See Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1991).
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habeas corpus appeals demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit has
repeatedly failed to comply with well-established Supreme
Court authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, indigent prisoners' direct appeals and
habeas corpus appeals have burgeoned, occupying an
increasingly larger share of the Fifth Circuit's docket.67
However, the Supreme Court has held that the application of the
frivolousness standard in defendants' "appeals from criminal
convictions cannot be used as a convenient valve for reducing
the pressures of work on the courts." 68
The Supreme Court has directed defense counsel to
"resolve all doubts and ambiguous legal questions in favor of
his or her client" in determining whether an appeal is frivolous
and requires counsel to seek to withdraw under Anders.69 An
appellate court likewise should resolve all doubts and
ambiguous legal questions in favor of a defendant in deciding
whether an issue is legally frivolous. When an issue presented
on appeal finds direct support in a decision of one or more other
lower courts and the issue has not yet been resolved by an
authoritative decision of the Supreme Court, the issue is
obviously "ambiguous" and, by definition, nonfrivolous.
67. See Statement of the Honorable Carolyn Dineen King, Circuit Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, before the Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/dallas/king.
htm> (last updated Mar. 31, 1998).
68. See Coppedge v. U.S., 369 U.S. 438, 450 (1962).
69. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See McCoy v. Ct. App. Wis., 486 U.S.
429, 444 (1988).
